

THE
EUTHYPHRO AND CRITO
OF
PLATO

TRANSLATED BY
ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A.
PEMBROKE COLLEGE, OXFORD,
LECTURER IN GREEK
AT
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1909.



EUTHYPHRO

[OR ABOUT HOLINESS, A TENTATIVE DIALOGUE].

Characters of the Dialogue:—

EUTHYPHRO.

SOCRATES.

St. 1.
P. 2

A *Euth.* What has happened out of the common, Socrates, that you have left your haunts in the Lyceum and are now spending your time here about the King's Porch ? It surely cannot be that you have a suit before the King, as I have.

So. The Athenians, Euthyphro, do not call it a suit, but an indictment.

B *Euth.* What do you say ? Someone, it seems, has brought an indictment against you ; for I will not pay you so bad a compliment as to suppose that it is you who have brought one against someone else.

So. No indeed.

Euth. Well, has someone else brought one against you ?

So. Quite so.

Euth. Who is he ?

So. I don't know the man very well myself, Euthyphro, for he seems to me to be someone who is young and unknown ; however they call him, I think, Meletus, and he is by deme a Pitthean, if you remember one Meletus a Pitthean, a kind of lank-haired man, without much beard, but with a hooked-nose.

C *Euth.* I have no idea of him, Socrates. But what indictment has he brought against you ?

So. What indictment ? A rather fine one, it seems to me. For that he though young should know a

matter of such importance is no slight thing. For he, as he says, knows in what way the young are spoilt and who are they that are spoiling them. And it may be that he is a sage, and that having observed my ignorance from the way in which I am spoiling his contemporaries, he is coming to accuse me before the state as before a mother. And it seems to me that he is the only **D** statesman who is beginning in the right way; for the right way is first to bestow attention upon the young to see how they shall be as good as possible, just as it is natural for a good husbandman first to bestow attention on the young plants, and after that on the others also. **3 A** Even so Meletus perhaps is first clearing me away as spoiling the growth of the young, as he says; then after this it is clear that he will turn his attention to the older men and so become the cause of very many, and very great benefits to the state, as is likely to be the result when he begins in such a way.

Euth. I could wish it were so, Socrates, but I am horribly afraid lest it may turn out the other way; for he simply seems to me to be beginning from the hearth to injure the state, when he tries to do wrong to you. Now tell me, by what course of conduct does he say that you are spoiling the young?

So. It is a queer story, my dear sir, on first hearing **B** at all events. For he says that I am a maker of gods, and it is as making new gods and not letting the old ones pass that he has brought an indictment against me just for this reason, as he says.

Euth. I understand, Socrates. It is because you say that the supernatural something occurs to you every now and then. It is then as innovating in divine matters that he has brought this indictment against you, and it is therefore with intent to misrepresent you that he is coming before the court, knowing that such things lend themselves easily to misrepresentation before the multitude. You must know that in my case also, whenever I say anything in the assembly about divine matters, **C** foretelling to them things to come, they laugh me down as a madman, and yet not one of my predictions but has

come true, but still they envy all such persons as we are. But we must not mind them at all, but meet them boldly.

D So. Well, my dear Euthyphro, to be ridiculed is perhaps no matter. For the Athenians, as it seems to me, don't very much mind if they think somebody to be clever, provided that he is not inclined to teach his own wisdom ; but whenever they think that a man is making others like himself, they become enraged, whether indeed it be out of envy, as you say, or for some other reason.

Euth. Well as regards that I am not particularly desirous to make the experiment how they feel towards me.

E So. Yes, you perhaps have the reputation of making yourself scarce and not being willing to teach your own wisdom : but I am afraid lest owing to my love towards mankind I may be thought to say whatever I have to say without the least reserve to every man, not only without fee, but even being glad to pay anyone who is willing to listen to me. If then, as I was saying a moment ago, they were likely to laugh at me, as you say they do at you, it might be pleasant enough to spend one's time joking and laughing in court ; but if they are going to be serious, that is a matter the issue of which is uncertain to all except seers like you.

Euth. Well perhaps it will come to nothing, Socrates, but you will contend in your suit to your liking, and I think so will I to mine.

So. What then is your suit, Euthyphro ? are you defendant in it or plaintiff ?

Euth. Plaintiff.

4 A So. Against whom ?

Euth. Against one for prosecuting whom I am again accounted mad.

So. Why ? Are you pursuing someone who can fly ?

Euth. He's far enough from flying, seeing that he's quite an old man.

So. Who is he ?

Euth. My own father.

So. Your own father, my good sir ?

Euth. Just so.

So. And what is the charge and what is the trial for?

Euth. For murder, Socrates.

So. Heracles! Verily, Euthyphro, the many do not know how right stands; for I do not think that such conduct is open to any and everybody, but only to one **B** who is far advanced in wisdom.

Euth. Yes, far enough, by Zeus, Socrates.

So. Is it then one of your relations who has been killed by your father? Plainly it must be so. For I cannot suppose that you would have prosecuted him for murder on behalf of a stranger.

Euth. It is absurd of you, Socrates, to suppose that it makes any difference whether the person killed is a stranger or a relation, instead of this being the only thing necessary to observe, whether the slayer slew him justly or not, and if justly, to let him be, but if not to prosecute, particularly if the slayer share your hearth and table; for the pollution incurred is equal if you **C** associate knowingly with such a person instead of purifying yourself and him by a legal prosecution. Though as a matter of fact the person killed was a dependant of my own, and when we were farming in Naxos he was a labourer there with us. Well then having become the worse for liquor and being enraged with one of our servants he slaughtered him. So my father bound him hand and foot, and having flung him into a ditch, sends a man hither to enquire of the Interpreter what was the proper thing to do. Meantime he disregarded and neglected the bound man as **D** a murderer and as though it were no matter if he did die, which was just what happened to him, for owing to hunger and cold and the bonds he died before the messenger came back from the Interpreter. That then is why my father is indignant with me, as are also the rest of my relations, because I am prosecuting my father on behalf of the murderer, though he did not kill him, as they say, nor if he did kill him ever so much, was it necessary, as the person killed was a murderer, to trouble one's head on behalf of such an one, for they

E think it unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder, being ill informed, Socrates, how the question of religion stands as regards the holy and the unholy.

So. But in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you suppose that you have such an exact knowledge about the nature of religious questions, and about things holy and unholy, that the facts being so as you state, you are not afraid in going to law with your father lest you on the other hand should be doing an unholy thing?

5 A *Euth.* No, for there would be no good in me, Socrates, nor would there be any point in which Euthyphro would be superior to the common run of men, if I had not an exact knowledge on all such matters.

So. Is it not then, my wonderful Euthyphro, the best thing for me to become your disciple, and before the indictment in which I have to face Meletus to challenge him on this very point, saying that I both in former time regarded it as of great importance to know about religious matters, and that now, since he asserts that I am going wrong in improvising and innovating in matters of religion, I have therefore become your disciple—‘and if you, Meletus,’ I would say, ‘admit that Euthyphro is wise on such points, then think that I also hold the orthodox opinion, and do not be at law with me; but if not, bring an action against him, the teacher, before you do so against me, on the ground that he is spoiling the elder men, me, and his own father: me by teaching, and him by admonishing and chastising’—and if he does not act on my advice, nor release me from the proceedings, or indict you instead of me, to mention in court this very challenge which I gave him?

C *Euth.* Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, if he were to try to indict me, I would find out, I think, his weak point, and we should have to talk about him in court a long time before talking about me.

So. It is just as holding this opinion, that I too, my dear friend, am anxious to become your disciple, knowing that this person Meletus, as well as many another I dare say, does not seem even to see you,

whereas he has so keenly and easily descried me that he has indicted me for impiety. Now then in the name of Zeus tell me that on which you were just now insisting that you knew so well, what is it that you say is the nature of the pious and the impious both in the case of bloodshed and of all other things? Is not the **D** holy the same with itself in all conduct, and the unholy on the other hand the opposite of the holy in every case, but like itself and presenting some one form in virtue of its unholiness whenever a thing is of a nature to be unholy.

Euth. Assuredly so, Socrates.

So. Tell me then, what do you say is the holy and what the unholy?

Euth. I say then that the holy is precisely what I am now doing, to prosecute one who does wrong either in the matter of bloodshed, or of sacrilege, or who commits any other sin of that sort, whether it be father, or mother, or anyone else whatever, and that to refrain **E** from prosecuting is unholy. Why, just look Socrates, how great a proof I will give you that the law is so—it is a thing which I have told people before to show that these things would be right if done in this way—not to give way to the person who commits impiety no matter who he may be. For men themselves, as a matter of fact, consider Zeus to be the best and most just of the gods, while at the same time they admit **6 A** that he imprisoned his father because he was swallowing his sons unrighteously, and that *he* again mutilated *his* father for other similar reasons. But they are angry with me, for prosecuting my father when he does wrong, and so they contradict themselves in the two cases of the gods and me.

So. I wonder, Euthyphro, whether this is the reason why I am being prosecuted on this indictment, namely, that, whenever anyone makes such statements about the gods, I receive them with a sort of disgust. For which reason, as it seems, some one will say that I am doing wrong. Now therefore if you also, who know well about such matters, approve of these statements, it is

Binevitable, as it seems, for persons like myself to give in. For what are we to say, seeing that we admit that we ourselves know nothing about them? But tell me in the name of the God of Friendship do you really consider that these things took place so?

Euth. Yes, and things still more surprising than these, Socrates, of which the many do not know.

So. Then do you consider that there is really war among the gods against one another, and terrible enmities and battles and many other such things, of the kind which are spoken of by the poets, and our

Ctemples in general are bedecked with them by the best painters, and furthermore at the great Panathenæa the robe full of such devices is brought up to the Acropolis? Are we to say that these things are true, Euthyphro?

Euth. Yes, not only so, Socrates, but as I said just now, I will, if you like, recount to you many other things about divine matters, which I am quite sure you will be astonished to hear.

DSo. I should not be surprised. But these things you shall tell me another time, when we are at leisure, but just at present try to tell more clearly what I asked you just now. For, my friend, on the former occasion you did not sufficiently instruct me when I asked you what the holy was, but you told me that this is holy which you are now doing, in prosecuting your father for manslaughter.

Euth. Yes, and I said truly, Socrates.

So. Perhaps. But surely, Euthyphro, there are many other things also which you say are holy.

Euth. Yes, there are.

So. Do you remember then that it was not this I bade you do, to inform me of one or two of the many holy things, but of that very kind whereby all the holy things are holy. For you said, I think, that it was owing to one form that the unholy things are unholy and the holy

Eholy. Do you not remember?

Euth. I do.

So. Then explain to me just what this idea is, in order that, fixing my gaze on that and employing it as

a pattern, I may assert that whatever corresponds to it in what you or anyone else does is holy, and may deny the same of whatever does not.

Euth. Well if you wish to have it in your way, Socrates, I will tell you in your way.

So. Well I do wish it.

Euth. The holy then is that which the gods love, and **7 A** what they do not love is unholy.

So. You have answered very well now, Euthyphro, and just in the way I was trying to get you to answer. Whether, however, your answer is true, is a thing which I do not know yet, but you of course will further inform me of the truth of what you say.

Euth. Certainly.

So. Come then, let us examine what we are saying. The thing or a person whom the gods love is holy, and the thing or the person whom they hate is unholy. And the holy is not the same thing with the unholy, but quite the opposite. Is it not so?

Euth. It is so.

So. And does it seem to have been well said?

Euth. I think so, Socrates [for it has been said.] **B**

So. Then that the gods, Euthyphro, fall foul of one another, and quarrel with one another, and that there is mutual enmity among them, has this also been said?

Euth. Yes, it has been said.

So. And what are the things, my good sir, difference about which causes enmity and bad passions? Let us look at it in this way. If you and I were to differ about number, as to which of two sums were the greater, would the difference about these things make us enemies and angry with one another, or about such points at least should we have recourse to reckoning and soon be quit of the matter?

Euth. Certainly.

So. Then, if we were to differ about the greater and less, should we have recourse to measuring and soon desist from our difference?

Euth. That is so.

So. And by having recourse to weighing, I suppose we should decide a question of heavier or lighter?

Euth. To be sure.

So. What then is the thing about which if we differed and what the decision to which if we are unable to come, we should be enemies to one another, and get angry over it? Perhaps the answer does not come readily to you, but let me say, and do you consider whether these **D** things are the just and the unjust, and right and wrong, and good and bad. Are not these the things about which when we differ and are not able to reach a competent decision about them, both you and I and all other men become enemies to one another, when we do become so?

Euth. Yes, this is the difference, Socrates, and it is about these things.

So. And what of the gods, Euthyphro? If they have any differences, would not their differences be due to just these things?

Euth. That is quite necessary.

E *So.* Then among the gods also, my noble Euthyphro, some deem some things to be just, and others others, according to your statement, and so with things right and wrong, and good and bad. For they would not have fallen foul of one another, unless their difference were about these things. Is that so?

Euth. You say rightly.

So. Then do they also love those things which they severally deem to be right and good and just, and hate the opposite of these?

Euth. Certainly.

8 A *So.* And it is the same things, as you say, which some deem just and others unjust and about which they dispute and fall foul of and go to war with one another. Is it not so?

Euth. It is so.

So. Then the same things as it seems, are both hated by the gods and loved, and the same things will be god-hated, and god-loved.

Euth. It seems so.

So. Then the same things, Euthyphro, will also be both holy and unholy according to this definition.

Euth. It may be so.

So. Then you have not answered what I asked, estimable sir. For my question was not about a thing which is at the same time holy and unholy; whereas whatever is god-loved is also god-hated, as it seems. So that, Euthyphro, it would be no wonder if in acting **B** as you are now doing, namely, chastising your father, you are doing what is welcome to Zeus, but hateful to Cronos and Uranos, and dear to Hephaestus but hateful to Hera, and, if any others of the gods differ one from another about it, so on with them also.

Euth. But I think, Socrates, that about this at least **C** no one of the gods differs from any other, namely that whosoever has put a man to death unjustly ought to pay a penalty?

So. Why? Have you ever yet, Euthyphro, heard any human being dispute that he who has unjustly put a man to death, or is doing anything else whatever unjustly ought to pay a penalty?

Euth. Nay rather they never cease disputing on these points, both elsewhere and in the law-courts. For while they commit very many acts of injustice, they leave nothing undone or unsaid in their efforts to escape the penalty.

So. Do they at the same time admit, Euthyphro, that they are committing injustice, and while admitting it do they say all the same that they ought not to pay a penalty?

Euth. No, they don't say that.

So. Then it's not the case that they leave nothing undone or unsaid. For this I think they do not venture to say, nor to dispute that they should pay a penalty if **D** they are committing injustice, but, I take it, they deny that they are committing injustice. Is that so?

Euth. What you say is true.

So. Then they do not dispute about this point, that he who commits injustice ought to pay a penalty, but perhaps what they do dispute is this, who it is that is committing the injustice, and by doing what and when.

Euth. What you say is true.

So. Then are the gods also in just the same case, if according to your statement they fall foul of one another about things just and unjust, some of them asserting that they are doing injustice to one another while others deny this? Since this of course, estimable sir, no one either of gods or men has the hardihood to say, that he **E** who does injustice should not pay a penalty.

Euth. Yes, this statement of yours is true, Socrates, at least in the main.

So. But it is about the particular actions, I think, Euthyphro, that the disputants dispute, whether men or gods, if gods do dispute; it is about some line of conduct that they differ, some saying that it has been done justly, and others unjustly. Is it not so?

Euth. Certainly.

9 A **So.** Come then, my dear Euthyphro, instruct me also, that I may become wiser, what proof you have that all gods deem him to have been put to death unjustly, who having committed murder while acting as a hired labourer, has been bound by the master of the man who has been killed, and owing to his bonds has died, before he who bound him has been informed by the Interpreter what is the right thing to do in his case, and that on behalf of such an one as this it is right for the son to prosecute and bring a charge of murder against his father? Come, with regard to this, try to **B** give me some clear indication that above everything all gods deem that this conduct is right; and if you succeed in making it manifest to me, I will never cease lauding you on the ground of wisdom.

Euth. Well, perhaps it is no small business, Socrates, though I should be able to exhibit it to you quite clearly.

So. I understand. It is because you think me more stupid than the jurymen, since you will make it plain to them of course, that the case is one of injustice, and that the gods one and all hate such things.

Euth. Quite clearly, Socrates, if they listen to what I say.

C **So.** Well, they will listen, if they think you speak well. But here's a point which I noticed while you

were speaking and am considering with myself—‘ If Euthyphro were to make me understand ever so much that the gods one and all deem such a death to be unjust, wherein have I any the more been informed by Euthyphro what is the holy and the unholy ? For this act, as it seems, will be god-hated. But indeed it was found just now that it was not this which determined what was holy or not. For what was god-hated was found to be also god-loved.’ So that I let you off this task, Euthyphro. If you like, let all gods deem it unjust and let them all hate it. But as for this correction which **D** we are now making in the definition—that whatever all the gods hate is unholy and whatever they love holy ; whereas what some love and others hate, is neither or both, is that the way in which you would have the definition now stand for us about the holy and the unholy ?

Euth. Well, what's the hindrance, Socrates.

So. Nothing as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro. But it is for you to consider your own business, whether, if you make this assumption, you will so most easily teach me what you promised.

Euth. Well I would say that that is the holy which **E** all the gods love, and on the contrary that what all gods hate is unholy.

So. Then are we to look into this statement again, Euthyphro, to see whether it is well said or are we to let it pass, and simply accept a statement from ourselves or other people, admitting that a thing is so, if one only says that it is, or ought we to enquire into the meaning of him who makes the statement ?

Euth. We ought to enquire. For my own part however I think that this is now well said.

*So.* Soon, my good sir, we shall know better. For **10 A** consider such a point as this. Is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved ?

Euth. I don't know what you mean, Socrates.

So. Well I will endeavour to put it more clearly. Do we speak of a thing that is brought and a thing that brings and of a thing that is led and of a thing which leads and of a thing that is seen and of a thing that

sees, and in all such cases do you understand that the things are different from one another and wherein they are different?

Euth. I think I do understand.

So. Then is there also a thing that is loved and a different thing from this which loves?

Euth. To be sure.

B *So.* Tell me then is the thing which is brought the object of bringing, because it is brought, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, for this reason.

So. And the thing then which is brought because it is brought, and the thing which is seen because it is seen?

Euth. Certainly.

So. It is not therefore because it is the object of seeing that it is seen, but on the contrary because it is seen it is for this reason the object of seeing, nor because a thing is the object of leading is it therefore led, but because it is led it is for this reason the object of leading, nor because it is the object of bringing is it brought, but because it is brought it is the object of bringing. Is what I mean to say plain, Euthyphro? And what

C I mean to say is this, that if anything becomes or is affected in any way, it is not because it is the object of becoming that it becomes, but because it becomes it is the object of becoming; nor is it because a thing is the object of some affection that it is affected, but because it is affected it is the object of the affection? Do you not agree to that?

Euth. I do.

So. Is then the object of love either the object of a kind of becoming or of a kind of affection by something?

Euth. Certainly.

So. Then this also is on the same footing as the former instances. It is not because it is the object of love that it is loved by those by whom it is loved, but because it is loved it is the object of love.

Euth. It must be so.

So. What then are we saying about the holy, Euthyphro? Is it not loved by all gods, according to your statement?

Euth. Yes.

So. Is it then for this reason, that it is holy, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, but for this.

So. Then is it loved because it is holy, but not holy because it is loved?

Euth. It seems so.

So. But indeed it is because it is loved by gods that the god-loved is an object of love and god-loved.

Euth. To be sure.

So. Then according to what you are saying, Euthyphro, the god-loved is not holy, nor the holy god-loved, but one is different from the other.

Euth. How so, Socrates?

E

So. Because we admit that the holy is loved for this reason, because it is holy, but is not holy because it is loved. Is that so?

Euth. Yes.

So. Whereas of the god-loved we say that because it is loved by gods it is, from this very fact of being loved, god-loved, but is not loved owing to its being god-loved. 11 A

Euth. What you say is true.

So. But if the god-loved and the holy had been the same thing, my dear Euthyphro, in that case if the holy had been loved because it was holy, the god-loved also would have been loved because of its being god-loved, and if the god-loved had been god-loved, owing to its being loved by gods, the holy also would have been holy owing to its being loved; whereas now you see that they are opposed, as being quite different one from the other. For the one because it is loved, is of a nature to be loved; but the other because it is of a nature to be loved, is for this reason loved. And it may be Euthyphro, that, on being asked what the holy is, you have not been willing to reveal its essence to me, but are stating an accident about it, that the holy has this accident of being loved by all gods: but what its essence

B is, you have not yet said. If you please then, do not hide the thing from me but say again from the beginning what is the essence of the holy, whether it is loved by gods or whatever accident it has—for we will not dispute about that—but tell me with a right good will the essence both of the holy and of the unholy.

Euth. Well, Socrates, I am not able to tell you what I think. For whatever we have put forward somehow always moves about and will not stay where we have set it.

Cour statements, Euthyphro, seem to come from our forefather Daedalus. And if it was I who were making them and laying them down, perhaps you would have made fun of me, saying that in my case also, owing to my kindred to him, argumentative works of art run away and will not stay where one has set them. But, as it is, the assumptions are really yours. We therefore require some other joke; for they will not stay for you, as you yourself think.

Euth. But to me it seems, Socrates, that the statements call for much the same joke. For it is not I who am putting into them this trick of going about and not staying in the same place, but it is you who seem to me **D** to be the Daedalus, since as far as I am concerned these statements would have remained as they were.

E So. May be then, my friend, I have proved so much more skilful in art than that great man, inasmuch as he used only to make his own works not to stay, whereas I, as it seems, make those of others also as well as my own. And indeed this is the finest thing about my art, that I am an artist in spite of myself, for I would have liked my statements to stay and have an immovable basis rather than that I should have the wealth of a **T**antalus in addition to the skill of a Daedalus. But enough of this. But since you seem to me to disdain labour, I will myself do my best to help, in order that you may instruct me about the holy. And do not flag before you have done. For see whether you do not think it necessary that everything which is holy should be just.

Euth. I do.

So. Then is everything also which is just holy? Or is the holy in every case just, but the just not in every case holy, but some of it holy, and some of it something else?

Euth. I do not follow what is being said, Socrates.

So. And yet you have the advantage over me in youth quite as much as in wisdom. But, as I am saying, you disdain labour owing to wealth of wisdom. But, my gifted sir, pull yourself together; for it is not difficult to understand what I am saying. For I say, you must know, the opposite to what the poet did when he said—‘but Zeus the doer and he who engendered all these things he will not rail against: for where fear is, there is also shame.’ I then differ from this poet. Shall I tell you in what?

Euth. Certainly.

So. It does not seem to me to be true that ‘where fear is there is also shame,’ for it seems to me that many people in fearing diseases and poverty and many other things of that sort feel fear indeed, but feel no shame as to the things which they fear. Do not you think so also?

Euth. Certainly.

So. But that where shame is there is also fear. For is there anyone who being abashed and ashamed at something does not also dread and fear at the same time the repute of wickedness?

Euth. Yes, he fears it.

So. Then it is not right to say—‘for where fear is there is also shame,’ but ‘where shame is there is also fear,’ not however shame wherever there is fear. For fear, I take it, is a wider term than shame. For shame is a part of fear just as odd is a part of number, so that it is not the case that where number is, there is also odd, but where odd is, there is also number. Perhaps you follow now?

Euth. Quite so.

So. That then is the kind of thing that I meant when I asked, is it the case that, where just is, there is also

12 A

B

C

D holy? or is it rather that, where holy is, there is also just, but not holy, wherever there is just. For the holy is a part of the just? Are we to say so, or have you some different opinion?

Euth. No, let us say so. For you seem to me to be saying rightly.

So. Consider then the next step. For if the holy is a part of the just, we must of course, as it seems, find out what sort of part of the just the holy is. If then, you had asked me about one of the things which were mentioned just now, for instance, what sort of part of number the even is, and what is the essence of this number, I should have said that it is one which is not scalene but isosceles. Don't you think so?

Euth. I do.

E *So.* Then do you also try to inform me in that way what sort of part of the just is holy, in order that we may also tell Meletus not to do us an injustice any longer nor indict us for impiety, on the ground that we have already been adequately instructed by you as to the things that are pious and holy and as to those which are not.

Euth. This part then of the just, Socrates, seems to me to be pious and holy, which has to do with attendance on the gods, while that which has to do with attendance on human beings seems to be the remaining part of the just.

13 A *So.* And well do you seem to me to speak, Euthyphro, but there is one small thing which I am still in need of. For I do not yet understand what you mean by attendance. For I presume you don't mean that attendance on the gods is of quite the same sort as divers modes of attendance upon other things—for I suppose we say, for instance, 'It is not everybody who knows how to attend on horses, but only the groom.' Do we?

Euth. Certainly.

So. For the art of the groom is, I suppose, attendance upon horses.

Euth. Yes.

So. Nor does everyone know how to attend upon hounds but only the huntsman.

Euth. It is as you say.

So. For the huntsman's art, I suppose, is attendance upon hounds.

Euth. Yes.

So. And the drover's art is attendance upon oxen.

Euth. Quite so.

So. Then are holiness and piety, Euthyphro, attendance on gods? Is that what you mean?

Enth. It is.

So. Does every form of attendance then effect the same object? I mean this sort of thing. It is for some good and benefit to the thing attended on, as you see of course, that horses when attended on by the art of the groom receive benefit and become better. Do you not think so?

Euth. I do.

So. And dogs, I suppose, when attended on by the huntsman's art, and oxen by the drover's, and so on in C all other cases. Do you think that the attendance is to the hurt of the thing attended on?

Euth. No, by Zeus, I do not.

So. Well, is it to the benefit?

Euth. To be sure.

So. Then is it the case that holiness also being attendance upon gods is a benefit to gods and makes the gods better? And would you allow this, that, when you do anything holy, you are making some of the gods better.

Euth. No, by Zeus, I would not.

So. No, nor do I, Euthyphro, think that you mean this—I am far from doing so—but it was just for this reason that I asked you what you meant by attendance on the gods, because I did not think that you meant this D kind of attendance.

Euth. Yes, and you were right, Socrates; for I do not mean this kind.

So. Very well, but what attendance on the gods will holiness be?

B

C

D

Euth. That, Socrates, wherewith servants attend upon their masters.

So. I understand. It will be, as it seems, a kind of service to gods.

Euth. Just so.

So. Can you then tell me to the production of what effect the service rendered to physicians will be subservient? Do you not think to the production of health?

Euth. I do.

E *So.* And what of the service rendered to shipwrights? To the production of what effect is it subservient?

Euth. Clearly, Socrates, to the production of a ship.

So. And that rendered to house-builders, I suppose, to the production of a house?

Euth. Yes.

So. Tell me then, O best of men, to the production of what effect will the service rendered to gods be subservient? For it is clear that you know, since you say that you know divine matters better than any man.

Euth. Yes, and I say truly, Socrates.

So. Tell me then in the name of Zeus what is that glorious effect which the gods produce using us as ministers?

Euth. Many fine ones, Socrates.

14 A *So.* Well so do generals, my friend. But still you can easily sum up what they do by saying, that they produce victory in war. Is it not so?

Euth. To be sure.

So. And farmers also produce many fine effects; but still the sum of their production is subsistence from the earth.

Euth. Quite so.

So. What then? Of the many fine effects which the gods produce what is the sum of their business?

B *Euth.* I told you a little while ago, Socrates, that it is rather a long business to learn exactly how all these things are: this however I tell you broadly, that if one knows how to say and do what is grateful to the gods, in praying and sacrificing, that is the conduct which is

holy, and that is the kind of conduct which secures the safety both of private houses and also of commonwealths; and the opposite of what is grateful to them is impious, and this it is which upsets and destroys everything.

So. Surely, if you liked, Euthyphro, you might have told me much more briefly the sum of what I asked. But the fact is you have no zeal to instruct me—that is **C** clear. For now when you were just on the point you shirked giving an answer, which if you had given, I would then have learnt all that I wanted to know from you as to holiness. But now—as the suitor needs must follow the sued wherever the latter leads—what is it again which you say that the holy and holiness are? Do you not say that it is some knowledge about sacrificing and praying?

Euth. I do.

So. Then is sacrificing making a gift to the gods, and is praying asking of the gods?

Euth. Exactly so, Socrates.

So. Then as the result of this definition holiness will **D** be a science of asking from and giving to gods.

Euth. You have quite rightly understood what I said, Socrates.

So. That is because I am a passionate admirer, my friend, of your wisdom and am applying my mind to it, so that whatever you say will not fall on the ground. But tell me what is this service to the gods. Do you say that it is asking of and giving to them?

Euth. I do.

So. Then will the right asking be to ask them for those things which we need from them?

Euth. Why what else?

So. And again will the right giving be to present **E** them again in return with those things which they need from us. For surely it would not be an artistic way of making presents to give any one things of which he has no need.

Euth. What you say is true, Socrates.

So. Then holiness, Euthyphro, will be an art of trading with one another on the part of gods and men.

Euth. 'Trading,' if you please rather to call it so.

So. But nothing pleases me rather, if it is not true. But explain to me what is the benefit to the gods from the gifts which they receive from us? For what they

• 15 **A** give is a thing plain to every one. For we have nothing good that is not of their gift. But as to what they receive from us, wherein are they benefited? Do we get so much the better of them in the trading that we receive all goods from them and they none at all from us?

Euth. But do you suppose, Socrates, that the gods derive benefit from those things which they receive from us?

So. Well, what in the world can these gifts from us to the gods be, Euthyphro?

Euth. What else do you suppose than honour and tokens of honour and, as I said just now, gratitude.

B *So.* Then is the holy, Euthyphro, the outcome of gratitude, but not beneficial nor dear to the gods?

Euth. For my part I think that it is above all things dear.

So. Then the holy again, as it seems, is this, what is dear to the gods.

Euth. Most certainly.

So. Then in saying this will you be surprised if your statements appear not to stay where they are but to walk about, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus, who makes them walk, when you yourself are a far greater artist than Daedalus and make them go round in a circle? Do you not perceive that our definition in its revolution has got back to the same point?

C for I suppose you remember that previously the holy and the god-loved were found by us not to be the same thing, but different from one another. Do you not remember?

Euth. I do.

So. Do you not then observe that you are now saying that what is dear to the gods is holy, and does not this amount to its being god-loved? Is that not so?

Euth. Certainly.

So. Then either we were not right in what we ad-

mitted just now, or, if we were right then, we are wrong in the position which we are now taking up.

Euth. It seems so.

So. Then we must inquire over again from the beginning into what the holy is, since I, if I can help it, will not play the coward before I have learnt the lesson. But do not disdain me but give your whole attention **D** and now more than ever tell the truth: for you know, if any man does, and like Proteus one must not let you go before you have told it. For if you had not known for a certainty both the holy and the unholy, it is impossible that you could ever have attempted to prosecute your old father for murder, on behalf of a day labourer, but you would both have feared the gods too much to expose youself to the risk of acting wrongly therein and would also have been ashamed before men. But, as things are, I am sure you think that you have certain knowledge as to what is holy and what not. Tell me **E** then, my good Euthyphro, and do not hide from me whatever you think it to be.

Euth. Well another time, Socrates. For now I am in a hurry to get somewhere, and it is time for me to go away.

So. What a way to treat one, my friend! You are going away after dislodging me from the high hope which I was entertaining, that having been instructed by you as to what was holy and what not I shall get rid of the suit in which I have to encounter Meletus, by making it plain to him that I have already been rendered wise in divine matters by Euthyphro, and that I am no **16 A** longer owing to ignorance improvising or innovating about them, and furthermore that I should live better for the rest of my life.

CRITO

[OR ABOUT CONDUCT, AN ETHICAL DIALOGUE].

Characters of the Dialogue :—

SOCRATES. CRITO.

St. 1.
P. 43.

A *So.* Why have you come at such an hour, Crito ? Is it not still early ?

Cr. Yes, very.

So. About what time is it ?

Cr. Early morning.

So. I wonder how the keeper of the prison consented to listen to you.

Cr. He is accustomed to me by this time, Socrates, owing to my often coming hither, besides he has to a certain extent been benefited by me.

So. And have you come just now or some time ago ?

Cr. A good time ago.

B *So.* Then why did you not wake me at once, instead of sitting by me in silence ?

Cr. No, by Zeus, Socrates, I could wish that I myself were not thus awake and in sorrow. But I have been for sometime wondering at you, how pleasantly you sleep ; and I purposely refrained from waking you, in order that you might spend your time as pleasantly as possible. And often indeed before in your whole life have I thought you happy in your turn of mind, and far more so than ever in the calamity which has now beset you, in that you bear it so easily and gently.

So. Indeed, Crito, it would be a stupidity at my time of life, to be annoyed at having to die at once.

C *Cr.* Others, too, Socrates, at your time of life are

caught in the like calamities, but their age does not at all release them from being annoyed at the lot which presents itself.

So. That is so. But why is it that you have come so early?

Cr. Bringing news, Socrates, that is grievous, not to you, I daresay, but to me, and all your friends, both grievous and heavy, and which I, methinks, will be one of those who will find it hardest to bear.

So. What news is this you bring? Has the ship arrived from Delos, on the arrival of which I must die? **D**

Cr. No, it has not arrived, but it seems to me that it will come to-day from what some people report who have come from Sunium and left it there. It is clear then from these messengers that it will come to-day, and it will be necessary on the morrow, Socrates, as you know, for you to end your life.

So. Well, Crito, good luck attend it. If such be the will of the gods, so be it. I do not think however that it will come to-day.

Cr. Whence do you infer this?

So. I will tell you. You see I must die on the day after that on which the vessel shall have come.

Cr. So say they who have the disposal of these matters.

So. I do not think then that it will arrive on the day now coming on, but on the next. And I infer it from a dream, which I have seen a little while ago to-night: and it may be you did a seasonable act in not awaking me.

Cr. And what was the dream?

So. Methought a woman came up to me; she was fair and comely, dressed in white raiment, and called to **B** me saying 'Socrates, three days hence shalt thou come to the deep-soiled land of Phthiotis.'

Cr. What a strange dream, Socrates!

So. Nay, its meaning is plain, at least in my opinion, Crito.

Cr. Too much so, it seems. But, Socrates, you strange being, even now take my advice and let yourself

44 A

be saved: since, in case you die, there is more than one calamity for me, for apart from being deprived of such a friend in you as I shall never find again, it will also seem to many people, who do not well know you and me, that I was guilty of neglect, because I might have saved you, if I had been willing to spend money. And yet what reputation could be more disgraceful than this —of seeming to value money more than friends? For the mass of men will not believe that it was you who refused to escape, though we were eager that you should do so.

So. But pray why, my dear Crito, do you care so much about the opinion of the many? For the most virtuous, whom it is better worth minding, will think that the things took place as they do.

D *Cr.* But surely you see, Socrates, that it is necessary to care about the opinion of the many. And the actual state of things at present shows, that the many are able to work not the smallest of ills, but about the greatest, if anyone has been mis-represented to them.

So. Would that the many, Crito, were able to work the greatest ills, so that they might have been able, on the other hand to work the greatest good too, and it would have been well! But, as it is, they are able to do neither the one nor the other. For they are not able to make a man either wise or foolish, but they have such effect on him as may happen.

E *Cr.* As to that matter, let it be as you say: but tell me, Socrates, about this. You are not concerned, are you, for me and the rest of your friends, lest, in case you go away from here, the informers may give us trouble as having stolen you out of this, and we may be forced even to part with all our substance or a great deal of money, or even to suffer something else besides? For, **45 A** if you have any such fear as that, dismiss it. For it is but fair, you know, that we should run this risk, or a greater, if need be, if only we can save you. Now do take my advice and act as I say.

So. I am concerned, Crito, both for that and for many other things.

Cr. Do not then be afraid of this. For it is no great sum of money, for which certain people are willing to save you, and bring you away from here. And then do you not see how cheap these informers are, and there would be no need of much money to spend upon them? Now you have at your disposal my wealth, which, I take **B** it, is enough; and in the next place, even if out of regard for me you do not think proper to spend mine, there are the strangers whom you know of here, who are ready to spend theirs. One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has brought a sufficient sum of money for this very purpose; and Cebes too is ready, and so are a good many others. So, as I say, do not for fear of this, desist from the effort to save yourself, and do not let it trouble you, as you said in court, that you would not know what to do with yourself, if you went out of the country. For in many other places whither you may come, they will be glad to **C** have you; or, if you like to go to Thessaly, there are my friends there, who will make much of you and afford you protection, so that no one among the Thessalians will annoy you. Furthermore, Socrates, the thing you are attempting does not even seem to be right, namely, to betray yourself, when you might be saved; and you are doing your best to have that done to yourself which your enemies would do their best to effect, aye, and did do their best, in wishing to destroy you. And, besides this, it seems to me that you are betraying your own sons, whom you will go away and leave, though you might complete their rearing and education, and, as far **D** as you are concerned, they will fare as they may; and this in all likelihood will be as is usual with orphans that are left unprotected. For either one ought not to bring children into the world, or else one should bear one's full share in rearing and educating them: but you seem to me to be choosing the least troublesome course, whereas you ought to choose that course which a good and brave man would choose, especially as you assert that virtue is your care throughout your whole life. So I am ashamed both on behalf of you and on behalf of us **E** your friends, lest it may seem that the whole business

about you has been brought about through a certain want of manliness on our part, both the introduction of the case into court, how you appeared when you need not have done so, and the actual conduct of the trial, and that, as though to crown the absurdity of the matter,

A this last resource should seem to have escaped our notice, through a certain cowardice and unmanliness of ours, seeing that we did not save you, nor you yourself, when it was possible and practicable so to do, if we had been good for anything. Take care then, Socrates, lest this, in addition to the evil, may also bring disgrace on you and us. But form your plans, or rather, there is no longer time for forming them—they should be formed. And there is but one plan possible: for on the night now coming all these things must be accomplished. And if we shall wait at all, it will be impracticable and possible no more. Now I implore you, Socrates, be guided by me and do just as I say.

B *So.* My dear Crito, your zeal is invaluable, if it be at all accompanied by right; but if not, the greater it is, so much the worse. We ought then to consider whether we should do this or not: seeing that, not only now, but at all times, it is my character to obey no other of my friends save the argument which on consideration may appear to me to be best. And the arguments which I used to propound before, I am not able to reject now, when this chance has occurred to me, but they seem to

C me pretty much the same as ever, and I give the precedence and place of honour to the same as before. So that, if we have not a better than these to urge at present, be well assured that I will not give in to you, not even if the power of the many scare us like children with more bugbears than it does now, imposing imprisonments and deaths and confiscations of goods. What then is the fairest way in which we can examine the question? It would be, if we were to begin by taking up again this assertion which you make about opinions, and see whether it was rightly stated on various oc-

D casions or not, that we ought to attend to some opinions but not to others. Was this well stated before I had to

die, and has it now turned out after all to have been said idly for the sake of saying it, whereas it was childishness and nonsense in reality? I am eager, for my part, to inquire, Crito, along with you, whether it will appear to me at all of a different character, now that I am in this condition, or the same as before, and whether we shall give it the go by, or obey it. Now it was stated, I think, on various occasions by persons who thought there was something in what they said, somehow to this effect, as I was just now saying, that one ought to set a high value on some of the opinions which men **E** entertain, but not on others. In heaven's name, Crito, does not this seem to you to be well said? For you, in all human probability, are remote from the likelihood of dying to-morrow, and you will not have your judgement **47 A** disordered by the present contingency. Consider therefore. Does it not seem to you an adequate statement, that we ought not to respect all the opinions of men, but only some, and not others? And not the opinions of all men, but only of some, and not of others? Is not this rightly stated?

Cr. It is.

So. Ought we not then to respect the good opinions, and not the bad?

Cr. Yes.

So. And are not the good those of the wise, and the bad those of the foolish?

Cr. To be sure they are.

So. Come now. How again was this kind of thing stated? If a man is training, and making that his chief concern, does he attend to the praise, and blame and **B** opinion of every man, or only of that one, who may chance to be a doctor or trainer?

Cr. Only of that one.

So. He ought therefore to fear the blame and welcome the praise of that one, but not those of the many.

Cr. Plainly so.

So. He ought then to act and train and eat and drink in the way that approves itself to the one who superintends and understands the subject, rather than in that which approves itself to all the rest put together.

Cr. That is so.

C *So.* Very good. And if he disobeys the one, and slightslights his opinion, and his praises, but respects those of the many who understand nothing about it, can he avoid suffering some harm?

Cr. No. How could he?

So. And what is this harm? And what direction does it take, and on what part of the disobedient person does it take effect?

Cr. Clearly on his body: for this is what he is ruining.

So. You say well: is it not therefore the same in other cases, Crito, not to go through them all, and especially in questions of justice and injustice and wrong and right and good and bad, about which we are now deliberating,

D ought we to follow the opinion of the many and fear it, or that of the one, if there is any who understands the matter, whom we ought both to respect and fear more than all the rest put together? Whom if we fail to follow we shall be destroying and outraging that part of us, which we found to be made better by justice, and to be killed by injustice? Is there nothing in this?

Cr. I think myself there is, Socrates.

So. Tell me now, if we have destroyed that which is made better by health, and spoilt by illness, out of obedience to an opinion other than that of those who understand the matter, will life be worth living with it

E spoilt? And it is, if I mistake not, the body. Is it not?

Cr. Yes.

So. Will life then be worth living to us with a vicious and spoilt body?

Cr. By no means.

So. Well, can it be that life will be worth living to us with that part spoilt, to which injustice is an outrage, and justice a benefit? Do we deem inferior to the body that part of our nature, whatever it be, with which injustice and justice have to do?

Cr. By no means.

So. Well do we deem it of greater value?

Cr. Yes, of much greater.

So. Then, my good sir, we need not mind quite so much, what the many will say of us, but what the one will say who understands about justice and injustice, and what truth itself will say. So that, to begin with, you are wrong in this respect in your proposal, when you propose that we ought to mind the opinion of the many about what is just and right and good and their opposites. Yes but, some one may say, are the many able to put us to death?

Cr. That is plain, sure enough: for so one would say, **B** Socrates.

So. True. But, my dear sir, this argument, which we have discussed, seems to me to be as sound as ever. And look again at the following, to see whether it still remains to us or not, namely that we ought not to make living of the chief importance, but living well.

Cr. Yes, it does.

So. And that living well is the same thing as living rightly and justly, does this remain or does it not?

Cr. It does.

So. It follows then from our concessions that we must look into this, whether it is just for me to try to get away from here without the Athenians letting me go, or whether it is not just; and if it appear to be just, let **C** us try, and if not, let us leave it alone. But as for the considerations of which you speak, about spending money, about opinion, and about rearing children, these, Crito, are really questions which concern those who lightly put people to death, and would bring them back to life again, if they were able, without any reason; I mean the many, of whom we are speaking. But for us, after what has been proved, there is no other question save that of which we were speaking just now, whether we shall be acting justly in paying money and thanks to those who bring me away from here, and ourselves in bringing and being brought away, or whether in reality **D** we shall be acting unjustly in doing all these things. And, if we find it is unjust for us to do so, then we must not take into account either whether we must die, if we stay and keep quiet, or whether we must suffer anything else whatever in preference to acting unjustly.

Cr. Methinks you speak well, Socrates, but see what we are to do.

So. Let us look into the matter together, my friend, and on any point whereon you can contradict me as I speak, do so, and I will assent to you; but otherwise, **E** desist once and for all, my friend, from perpetually repeating to me the same statement, that I ought to go away from here without the consent of the Athenians. For I consider it of much importance to pursue my present course of conduct with your consent, instead of against it. But look at the starting point of the inquiry, whether in your opinion it is adequately stated, and

49 A try to answer the question in whatever way you think best.

Cr. Yes, I will try.

So. Do we say that we ought in no way voluntarily to do wrong, or ought we to do wrong in one way and not in another? Surely doing wrong at least is in no way either good or right, as was often admitted by us in the time gone by: which was what was stated just now. Can it be that all those former acknowledgements of ours have been scattered to the winds within the last few days, and have we after all, Crito, old men as we **B** are, been conversing seriously with one another for a long time back without knowing that we were no better than children? Surely above all things it is so, as was then stated by us, whether the many say it or not; and whether we must suffer still harder treatment than this or milder, nevertheless wrong-doing to the wrong-doer is both evil and disgraceful in every way. Do we say yes or no?

Cr. We say yes.

So. Then we must in no way do wrong.

Cr. No indeed.

So. Nor should one do it then in return when it is done to him, as the many imagine, seeing that we must in no way do wrong.

C *Cr.* It seems not.

So. Well then, ought we to do ill, Crito, or not?

Cr. No, assuredly not, Socrates.

So. Well, is it just, or not just, to do ill in return when one is ill-treated?

Cr. It is by no means just.

So. No, for doing ill to men, you know, does not differ at all from doing wrong.

Cr. What you say is true.

So. Then one ought not to do wrong in return nor to do ill to any man, no matter what one may suffer at men's hands. And see to it, Crito, in assenting to this, **D** that you do not assent contrary to your opinion. For I know that there are but few who hold, or will hold, this opinion. Those then who have formed this opinion and those who have not have no common ground, but must needs despise one another, when they view each other's counsels. Do you also then consider very carefully, whether you share with me and hold this opinion that I hold, and whether we are to start from this principle in our deliberations, that it is never right either to do wrong, or to do it in return, or to defend oneself when ill-treated by doing ill in return. Do you hold aloof and refuse to share in the first principle? For I have not only long been of this opinion, but am so **E** still, but if you have changed your opinion in any way, tell me and instruct me. But if you abide by our former opinions listen to what comes next.

Cr. Yes, I do abide by them, and am of the same opinion as you. Only say on.

So. Well then, I go on to say what comes next, or rather I put it in the form of a question. Ought one to do what one has admitted to some one to be just, or ought one to deceive him?

Cr. One ought to do it.

So. As a consequence of this then, consider. In **50 A**, going away from here without having obtained the consent of the state, are we doing harm to any people, and that too to those to whom we ought least of all to do it, or are we not? And are we abiding by what we admitted to be just, or are we not?

Cr. I cannot answer your question, Socrates: for I do not grasp your meaning.

So. Well, look at it in this way. If when we were on the point of running away from here, or whatever else we ought to call this proceeding, the laws and commonwealth were to come, and take their stand before us, and say—‘Tell me, Socrates, what are you minded to do ? Are you not by this step, which you are attempting,

B meaning to destroy us laws and the whole state, as far as in you lies ? Or do you think it possible for that state to exist any longer and not be overturned, in which the verdicts that have been given have no force, but are rendered ineffectual and destroyed by private persons ?’ What are we to say, Crito, in reply to this and other things to the same effect ? For one might be able to say a good deal, especially if one were an orator, on behalf of this law whose life is threatened, which ordains that the verdicts that have been pronounced should be carried out. Are we to say to them—‘ Why

C the state was doing us a wrong and did not give its verdict rightly ?’ Is it this we are to say, or what ?

Cr. Yes this, by Zeus, Socrates.

So. What then if the laws should say—‘ Socrates, is this the covenant that was made between us and you, or was it that you should abide by whatever verdicts the city may deliver ?’ If then we were to express surprise at what they said, perhaps they might reply ‘ Socrates, do not be surprised at what is said, but answer, since indeed you are in the habit of employing question and answer.

D Come now, what complaint have you against us and the state, that you attempt to destroy us ? To begin with, was it not we who brought you into being, and was it not by our means that your father married your mother, and begat you ? Explain therefore, do you in any way blame those of us which are laws about marriage, as not being right ?’ ‘ I do not blame them,’ I would say. ‘ Well, do you blame those which relate to the rearing and education of the offspring, that education under which you yourself were brought up ? Did those of us, which are appointed over these matters, not ordain rightly, in ordering your father to educate you in music and gymnastic ?’ ‘ They did ordain rightly,’ I would

say. ‘Very good. And when you had been born and bred and educated, can you maintain, in the first place, that you were not our offspring and bondsman, both yourself and your progenitors? And, since this is so, can you think that you have equal rights with us; and can you think that it is just for you to do in return to us whatever we may attempt to do to you? Can it be that, though you had not equal rights as against your father and against your master, if you had one, so as to do in return whatever was done to you—neither to answer back, when you were evil spoken of, nor to **51 A** strike back when you were struck, nor to do many other things of the kind: yet, as against your country and the laws, you will have such licence, that, if we attempt to destroy you, deeming it to be just, you too, it seems, will attempt to retaliate by destroying us laws and your country as far as you can, and will you say that in doing this you are acting justly, if you really care for virtue? Does your wisdom come to this, that you have failed to learn that your country is a thing worthy of more honour, more awful and more holy, than mother or father or all the rest of your progenitors, and held in higher esteem both with gods and with men who have understanding, and that you shonld reverence and more **B** readily give in to and conciliate your country, when it is angered, than your father, and either obtain its consent or do its bidding, and suffer whatever it may order you to suffer, keeping silence, whether it bid you to be beaten or imprisoned, or whether it lead you to war to meet wounds or death, that you must do these things, and that so it is right, and that you must not give way or retire or leave your rank, but both in war and in the law court and everywhere must do whatever your city and **C** your country bids you, or else convince them of what is naturally just, but to use force upon mother or father is not a holy thing, and far less so upon your country?’ What shall we say in reply to this, Crito? Shall we say that the laws speak true or no?

Cr. I think they do.

So. ‘Consider then, Socrates,’ the law perhaps may

say, 'if this statement of ours is true, that you are attempting to do us an injustice in what you are now attempting. For we, though we begat you, reared you, educated you, and gave a share of all the advantages that we could to you and to all the rest of your fellow-

D countrymen, nevertheless proclaim by having given permission to any of the Athenians who pleases when he has passed his examination, and has seen how things are managed in the state and us laws, if any one does not like us, we proclaim, I say, that it is allowed him to take his property and go off where he pleases. And none of us laws stands in the way or forbids, whether any of you wishes to go off to a colony, in case he does not like us and the state, or wishes to go and settle somewhere else, from going wherever he may please,

E and taking his property with him. But if any of you has stayed, when he sees the way in which we deliver verdicts and in other respects conduct the state, we say that by so doing he has agreed by his conduct that he will do whatever we bid him, and we say that the man who obeys us not is guilty of a triple wrong, in that we whom he refuses to obey begat him, and in that we reared him, and in that having agreed to obey us he does neither obey us nor obtain our consent to the contrary, if we are doing anything that is not well, though

52 A we set it before him and enjoin upon him in no ungentle fashion to do our bidding; but when we give him a choice of two alternatives, either to prevail upon us or to do it, he does neither the one nor the other. We assert that you also, Socrates, will come under the above charges, if you shall do what you are intending, and you not the least of the Athenians, but as much as anyone.' If then I were to say 'Wherefore so?' perhaps they might justly assail me and say, that I more than most of the Athenians have assented to this agreement. For

B they would say, 'Socrates, we have great evidence to show this, that you were pleased both with us and with the state: for you would never have stayed in it above all the rest of Athenians, if it had not pleased you above all, no, nor did you ever go out of the city to visit an

oracle, save once to the Isthmus, nor anywhere else except somewhere on a campaign, nor have you ever resided out of the country for any purpose, as other people do, nor have you been seized with the desire to know another state or other laws, but we and our state have been enough for you. So ardently did you choose **C** us, and agreed to live as a citizen in accordance with us, and above all you raised children to yourself in the city, which shows that you are pleased with it. Moreover, during the trial itself, it was in your power to assess the penalty at banishment, had you pleased, and to have done then with the consent of the state what you are now trying to do against it. But you then indeed made a fair show of not being put out, in case you had to die, but chose, as you said, death rather than banishment. But now you are not ashamed to belie the words you then uttered, nor do you care about us laws, for you are **D** trying to destroy us, and are acting in the way that the most worthless slave might act, in trying to run away contrary to the covenants and agreements, in accordance with which you covenanted with us to live as a citizen. To begin with then answer us first on this very point, whether what we say be true, when we assert that you agreed, by deed and not by word, to live as a citizen in accordance with us, or whether it be not true? What are we to say, Crito, in answer to the foregoing? Shall we not assent thereto?

Crit. We must, Socrates.

So. 'Are you not then,' they will say, 'transgressing the covenants and agreements with ourselves, though **E** you were neither forced nor cajoled into agreeing to them, nor compelled to make up your mind within a short time, but have had seventy years, in which you might have gone away, if you did not like us and the agreement did not seem to you fair. But you did not prefer either Lacedaemon or Crete, places which you take every occasion of saying are under good laws, nor any other city, whether Greek or foreign, but have been away **53 A** from this city less than the halt and blind and the maimed generally; so much did the state please you above all

the rest of the Athenians and we laws also, of course. For who could be pleased with a state apart from laws? But now indeed will you fail to abide by your agreements? Not so: at least if you will take our advice, Socrates. And you will not make yourself ridiculous by going away from the city.

‘For consider, if you transgress thus, and commit any **B** of these errors, what good will you be doing yourself or your friends. For that your friends will incur risk of being banished themselves and deprived of their country, or else of losing their property, is pretty plain. But as for yourself, to begin with, if you go to any of the nearest states, either to Thebes or to Megara—for they both enjoy good laws—you will come as an enemy, Socrates, to their constitution, and all who care for their own states will look upon you with suspicion, deeming you **C** a corrupter of the laws, and you will establish their reputation for the jurymen, and make them seem right in the verdict they gave. For whoever is a corrupter of the laws, will assuredly be thought to be a corrupter of young and silly persons. Will you then shun the states that are well-governed and the men who are best behaved? And if you do so, will life be worth your living? Or will you consort with them and have the effrontery to discourse—but what will you say, Socrates, the same words as here?—how that virtue and justice are the things of most value to men, and what is lawful and the laws? And do you not think that this will appear an **D** unseemly part for Socrates to play? You must think so. But will you depart from these places, and come to Thessaly to Crito’s friends? For there, as you know, there is the utmost disorder and unruliness; and perhaps they would be delighted to hear you tell in how absurd a manner you ran away out of prison, having put on some disguise, donning a sheepskin, or some such other thing as runaways are wont to dress themselves up in, and having altered your appearance. But that, being **E** an old man, and having in all probability but a short time left you to live, you could bring yourself to show such an avaricious desire for life, as to transgress the

most important laws, will there be no one to say this ? Perhaps not, if you do not offend anybody. But if you do, you will hear, Socrates, a good many things that will be degrading to you. You will live forsooth truckling to all the world and acting in servile sort. What will you be doing in Thessaly but eating and drinking, as though you had gone away to Thessaly to dine ? And as for those discourses about justice and virtue generally, pray, what will become of them ? Oh but, **54 A** you say, it is for your children's sake that you wish to live, in order that you may rear and educate them ! Well ? Will you bring them to Thessaly and rear and educate them there, making aliens of them, that this may be the benefit they reap from you ? Or will this indeed not be so, but, if they are reared here, will they be reared and educated better for your being alive, if you are not with them ? For your friends, you say, will take care of them. Will they take care of them, if you depart to Thessaly, and not take care of them, if you depart to the other world ? You must think they will, **B** if there is any good in them, in those who declare themselves to be your friends.

‘ But, Socrates, take the advice of us who reared you, and neither regard children nor life nor anything as of more account than justice, in order that, when you go into the other world, you may be able to urge all this in your defence before those who rule there. For neither here does it appear better for you to act thus or juster or holier, nor for any of your friends either, nor yet will it be better for you when you have gone thither. But, as things are, you will go away an injured man, if you do go, not by us laws but by human beings. But if you shall go out, having thus basely returned wrong for **C** wrong and evil for evil, having transgressed your own agreements and covenants that you made with us and wrought evil to those to whom least of all you should have done so, namely, yourself and friends and country and us, not only shall we be angry with you, while you live, but these also our brethren, the laws in the other world, will give you no kindly welcome, knowing that

you tried to destroy us, as far as in you lay. Nay, let
D not Crito persuade you to do what he says rather than
us.'

These words, my dear friend Crito, believe me, I seem
to hear, as those who are seized with the Corybantic
frenzy seem to hear the sound of flutes; and the echo of
these words keeps humming in my ears and renders me
incapable of hearing aught else. But know that, accord-
ing to my present thinking, if you say anything contrary
to this, you will waste your words. Nevertheless if you
think you will do any good, say on.

Cr. No, Socrates, I have nothing to say.

E So. Let be then, Crito, and so let us do, since thus
it is that God guides us.

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
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
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